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INTRODUCTION
-and that 'hows that
there are three hundred and sixty-four
days when you might get un-birthday
p~u-"

··ccnainly,''

~id

Alice.

.. And only one for birthday presenu,
you know. There's glory for your·
··1 don't know what you mean by
·glory~' ·· Alice 5aid.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptu·
ously... Of cour5e you don't-till I tell
you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down
argument for youf'"
"But 'glory' docm't mean ·a nice knockdown argument,'" Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty
said, in rather a scornful tone, .. it means
just what I choose it to mean-neitheT
more nor less.··
"The question is,·· said Alice, "whether
you can Ill2ke wor~ mean so many different things."

.. The que9tion is,'' aid Humpty
Dumpty, which is to be master-that's
all ...
Alice was too much puzzled to say any·
11

thing~

so after a minute Humpty Du!llpty
began again ... They've a temper, some of
them-panicularly verbs: they're the
proudest-adjectiv~ you can do anything
with. but not verbs-however, I can man·
age the whole lot of them! Impenetrability I That's what I say!"
,.Would you tell me, please." said Alice,
"what that means?"
"Now you talk like a reasonable child,"
said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much
pleased. ..I meant by ·impenetrability'
that we've had enough of that subject, and
it would be just as well if you'd mention
what you mean to do next, as I suppose
you don't mean to stop here all the rest
of your life."
"That's a great deal to mile one word
mean," Alice said in a thoughtful tone.
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.. When I make a word do a lot 0£ work.
like that," said Humpty Dumpty, "I al•
ways pay it
extra. ••
uOhl" said Alice. She was too much
puzzled to make my other remark..

''Ah, you should 54:e ·em come round
me of a Saturday night," Humpty Dumpty went oo, wagging his head gravely

from side to side, .. for to get their wages,
you know.··

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, pp. 268-270,
3rd . Ed . ( 19 6 8 ) .
This appeal is solely directed to the meaning of words.
As is the case in all statutory construction litigation
what the words of the statute mean and how they are applied
are the only issues to be decided on appeal.

Plaintiff St.

Benedict's Hospital asserts that the Board of Review of the
Industrial Corrunission of Utah, like Humpty Dumpty, uses
words in a manner it chooses it to mean regardless of the
true meaning of such words.
The words now in dispute in this appeal are "good cause"
and "equity and good conscience."

The meaning of these two

phrases is the sole issue in this appeal and Plaintiff will
therefore reply to the arguments raised by the defendants
in support of their interpretation of these words.
ARGUMENT
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS
ERRONEOUS IN THAT IT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED
THE UNEMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IN A MANNER
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Plaintiff does not disagree with the Statement of Facts,
or the arguments contained in Point I, II and II of Defendants'
Brief.

(Defendants Brief, pp. 2-6).

-2-

Plaintiff would, however,
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make several observations.
First, Plaintiff believes that the record is clear that
nurse Petersen told Mr. Featherston of the problem she was
having with her supervisor as is evidenced by the dialogue
on pages 21 and 22 of the transcript.

Since this factual

dispute is immaterial to this appeal no further comment is
necessary.
Second, there is no doubt that the standard of review
in these types of cases is difficult for the plaintiff to
sustain.

In cases involving an interpretation of facts,

for example, this Court will almost universally uphold the
decision of the Board of Review providing there is any evi~

dence to support its findings.

However, when the Board of

Review has obviously misinterpreted the law as is evidenced
by its own decision, a reversal is justified.
Third, Plaintiff agrees that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist a worker and his family during
times of unemployment and to help maintain the purchasing
power of the unemployed person and his family in the economy.
However, the Legislature has clearly indicated that not all
unemployed persons, regardless of the purpose of employment
compensation, are entitled to unlimited benefits merely
because they are unemployed.

The numerous reasons why unemploy-

ment insurance cannot be given to a person as ennunciated in
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the statutes show that this legislative intent is carefully
defined to only those persons who are deemed deserving of
these benefits.
Plaintiff vigorously opposes the contentions raised in
Point IV of Defendants' Brief concerning the correct interpretation of Section 35-4-5(a) of the Employment Security Act.
(Defendants' Brief, pp. 7-15).

As to Point V, Plaintiff will

not respond into justifying the decision of the Board of
Review or further reviewing the evidence in that the Board incorrectly applied an erroneous standard of review and therefore detailed arguments as to the justification of this
standard serve no purpose.
Plaintiff would also request the Court in considering
this case review the facts and arguments raised in Case No.
17922 entitled "Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission of Utah and Marian Lynch."

While

portions of that appeal go beyond the issues raised in this
appeal, the same contention of misinterpretation of Section
35-4-5(a) U.C.A. was also raised in that case.

In that instance,

the Board of Review also determined that there was no good
cause for the Salt Lake City employee to quit her job but
decided that the decision to resign was reasonable and therefore granted the employee full benefits.
Both parties heretofore have quoted the statute now in
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dispute, Section 35-4-S(a).

To briefly review, however,

the statute allows benefits to be paid to an unemployed
individual if the person left work voluntarily with good
cause.

The statute also provides, however, that no claimant

shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant leaves work
under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary
to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
Finally, the statute seemingly defines equity and good
conscience as the reasonableness of the claimant's actions
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market.
The Appeals Referee specifically stated in his Findings
that the defendant Carol Petersen did not terminate her
employment with good cause.

The Board of Review agreed with

this conclusion and stated that the reasons given by Mrs.
Petersen "are not compelling and therefore do not constitute
good cause.''

(R. 6).

The Board, however, held that these

same reasons were "sufficiently mitigating to give reason to
the claimant's decision to leave work" and therefore it would
be a denial of equity and good conscience not to allow benefits.
The interpretation by the Board of Review on its face
indicates the existence of two separate standards.

First,

a standard determining whether good cause has been found and
secondly whether even in the absence of good cause a claimant
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can receive benefits since the denial would be against
equity and good conscience.

If, indeed, there were two

separate standards and two separate sets of criteria to be
used in determining these two concepts the decision of the
Board of Review would be supportable.

However, there is no

such double standard and, as elaborated in Plaintiff's Brief
in chief, the standard for both "good cause" and for "equity
and good conscience" is identical.

This identical stanard

can be seen as follows:
The term "good cause" has been defined both by this
Court and by the regulations of the Industrial Commission
itself.

In Denby v. The Board of Review of the Industrial

Commission, 567 P.2d 626 (Utah 1977) the court noted that a
claimant must be available for work and must be genuinely
attached to the labor market. The court further noted that
"good cause" is a cause which would similarly affect persons
of reasonable and normal sensitivity and where the pressures
of the employment are so compelling that a reasonably prudent
person would be justified in quitting under similar circumstances.

The court also noted that it was the burden of the

claimant to prove that good cause existed.

See also, Box

Elder County v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 632 P.2d 839
(Utah 1981) .
The Industrial Commission has similarly defined "good
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cause" for unemployment benefit purposes as follows:
"Good cause", as used in the unemployment
insurance system, is such a cause as justifies
an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of
the employed and joining the unemployed; the
leaving must be for such cause as would reasonably motivate in a similar situation the
average worker to give up employment with its
wage rewards to become unemployed. The terms
suggest, as minimum requirements, real circumstances, substantial reasons, objective conditions, perceivable forces, adequate excuses
that will bear the test of reason, just grounds
for action.
To constitute good cause, the
circumstances which compel the decision to
leave must be real, not imaginary; substantial,
not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical.
There must be some compulsion from some outside
and necessitous circumstance. The standard of
what constitutes good cause is the standard of
reasonableness as applied to the average individual and not to the supersensitive.
Rule
A71-07-2:7i(2), Rules of Adjudication, Industrial
Commission of Utah.
These definitions clearly show that "good cause" is
determined by the "reasonableness" of the claimant's actions
and by his attachment to the labor force.
The terms "equity and good conscience" as noted in
Plaintiff's prior Brief are normally defined as conditions
which have almost unlimited discretion on the part of the
arbitrator.

What is "equitable" or "in good conscience"

depends upon the reviewer's sense of justice and may easily
vary from individual to individual.
The defendants, however, reject this normal standard
and contend that the Legislature structured the discretion the

-7-
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Commission may exercise.

The defendants argue that the

statute itself limits the terms of "equity and good conscience"
by its own definition.

(Defendants' Brief, p. 12).

Assuming

arguendo that this claim is true a total circle of definitions
has been reached.

Section 35-4-S(a) states the following:

The Commission shall in cooperation with
the employer consider for the purposes of this
Act, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market
in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and
good conscience.
Thus, assuming the defendants' argument is correct the
definition of equity and good conscience as limited by the
statute itself is one of "reasonableness" and a continuing
"attachment to the labor market."
It is obvious, therefore, that the definitions of both
"good cause" and "equity and good conscience" are identical.
Seemingly, a person who is reasonable in quitting his employment would have good cause for such quitting and it would not
be contrary to equity and good conscience to allow him benefits.

Conversely, a person who is unreasonable in quitting

his job and who has no genuine continuing attachment to the
labor market would not have good cause for quitting nor
would it be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose
a disqualification.
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The decision of the Board, however, when paraphrased
in light of its findings would be as follows:

The claimant

was criticized by her supervisor before conducting training
sessions and was denied a transfer to another assignment for
which she was experienced solely because the supervisor of
the new unit would have been a friend of the claimant's.

It

was not reasonable for claimant to leave her employment and
therefore there is not good cause for termination.

However,

the criticism by her supervisor and the denial of transfer
was a reasonable basis for the claimant to leave work and
this, together with the fact she immediately commenced a
search for work upon leaving her employment requires that
benefits be paid since to do otherwise would be contrary to
equity and good conscience.
As is patent on its face, the actions of the claimant
cannot be both reasonable and unreasonable at the same time
thereby requiring denial of the benefits because of their
unreasonableness but reinstating the benefits because of their
reasonableness.
The defendants admit that the "equity and good conscience"
language is not found in any other statutes in the country
and therefore requests that this Court examine the legislative
history of the passage of this act.

While it is no doubt

relevant to examine legislative history Plaintiff does not
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believe that the defendants have produced relevant testimony
or documents germane to such history.
Whatever lobbying efforts took place on behalf of the
advisory council or whatever opinions were given by the Department of Employment Security as to the interpretation of the
proposed legislation is irrelevant in determining legislative
intent.

Murphy v. Nilsen, 527 P.2d 736 {Ore. App. 1974).

Likewise, any statements made by Defendants' counsel during
hearings is not relevant to legislative history.

Henthorn v.

Grand Prairie School District No. 14, 601 P.2d 1243 {Ore. 1979).
It is well settled that statements by legislators or even
committee reports do not necessarily reflect the purpose
which the majority of legislators believed was being carried
out by the passage of a statute.

Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital,

433 P.2d 220 {Hawaii 1967).
It is interesting to note from the purported legislative
history that the defendants' own administrator acknowledged
that "good cause" was still to be determined by the definitions
of this Court.

{Appendix 2 of Defendants' Brief).

On the

other hand, however, Defendants argue that the term "reasonable"
cannot have the same meaning under the equity and good conscience
provision as it does under the "good cause" standard since
there would have been no need for the exception to be negotiated
by the labor and management representatives on the advisory

-10-
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council unless the definitions were different.

(Defendants'

Brief, p. 11).
Whatever may have been the hopes of the advisory council
or the purposes of the lobbyists in sponsoring the bill, the
fact remains that the present statute incorporates both the
term "good cause" and specifically defines "equity and good
conscience'' in the act itself.

Whereas under the prior act

the Commission was given discretion in assessing the penalty
of a claimant who failed to quit with good cause, i.e., whether
the claimant would be penalized one to six weeks with no benefits.
The new law specifically provides no such unlimited discretion
on penalty but merely states the criteria to be used in determining initial liability.
Thus, whereas under the prior law the Cormnission could
have found Mrs. Petersen to have quit with no just cause but
could have decided to only penalize her for one week period.
The present law requires the Commission to either grant her
full benefits (by finding that she quit with cause and that
benefits should be extended to her in equity and good conscience)
or to deny all benefits to her (finding she quit without cause
and that denial of benefits is equitable and conscionable) .
Thus, the same standard of determining "causation" also determines the "penalty" that the claimant will receive.

There is

no longer a provision allowing a partial penalty to a person

-11-
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quitting without good cause.
In summary, if the statute as written is to be harmonized
at all the terms "equity and good conscience" must be used in
conjunction with findings of good cause and not in an attempt
to establish a second standard.

To do so produces an absurd

consequence as in this case where the Board of Review finds
the same actions of the claimant to be both reasonable and
unreasonable at the same time.

It is a cardinal rule of

construction that statutes should not be applied to lead to
incongruous results which were never intended by the Legislature.

Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964).

The statute

must be given reasonable and sensible construction to prevent
such absurd consequences.

Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc.,

575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978).
The sole standard that should be raised on appeals such
as this is the reasonableness of the claimant's actions and
the claimant's continuing attachment to the work force.

In

such a case if the Board finds the actions of the claimant
reasonable and finds a continuing attachment to the work force
an employer can only appeal if he believes the evidence does
not justify that decision.

If, on the other hand, the Board

finds the actions to be unreasonable or finds no attachment
to the work force the employee would then have to decide
whether the evidences justifies the decision.

The arguments
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raised, for example, in Point V of the Defendants' Brief
would be properly addressed to this Court were the evidence
being attacked.
The present interpretation of the Board, however,
illogical and contrary to law.

.

lS

It is impossible for the Board

to justify its decision that no good cause is present by
showing that the claimant was unreasonable or showed no continuing attachment to the work force and then, at the same
time, decide that the same circumstances show a reasonableness
of the actions of the claimant and a continuing attachment to
the work force justifying the equitable and good conscience
exception which they claim exists to the good cause standard.
There can be only one determination of benefits based upon
the criteria established by this Court and by the agency
itself.

Whether the terms be called "good cause", "equity

and good conscience", or "kinetic streams of awareness" (or
any other term the interpreter desires) the criteria used
to define these terms must be uniform and must be in conformity
to this Court's prior decisions and the rules of the agency
itself.
To allow anything other than this type of interpretation
creates only chaos, confusion, and a breakdown of all standards
of the unemployment system.
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CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, therefore, this Court should
affirm the findings of the Appeals Referee and of the Board
of Review finding no "good cause" for the termination of
claimant's employment and should deny claimant all benefits
or, in the alternative, should remand this matter to the
Board of Review for the purpose of reconsideration in light
of one and only one appropriate standard of consideration.
Respectfully submitted,

ByM.~
G~Mham

Attorneys for Plaintiff
St. Benedict's Hospital
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prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Plaintiff to Floyd G. Astin, K. Allan Zabel,
Special Assistants to the Utah Attorney GeIEral, 174 Social
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